Emotional Actions Are Coded via Two Mechanisms: With and without Identity Representation by Wincenciak J et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
 
 
Newcastle University ePrints - eprint.ncl.ac.uk 
 
Wincenciak J, Ingham J, Jellema T, Barraclough NE. Emotional Actions Are 
Coded via Two Mechanisms: With and without Identity Representation. 
Frontiers in Psychology 2016, 7, 00693. 
Copyright: 
© 2016 Wincenciak, Ingham, Jellema and Barraclough. This is an open-access article distributed under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in 
other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original 
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or 
reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. 
DOI link to article: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00693 
Date deposited:   
17/05/2016 
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 11 May 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00693
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 693
Edited by:
Rocco Palumbo,
Schepens Eye Research Institute,
Massachusetts Eye and Ear, USA
Reviewed by:
Christopher P. Benton,
Bristol University, UK
Chiara Fini,
CNC Centre of Cognitive
Neuroscience, Italy
*Correspondence:
Joanna Wincenciak
joanna.wincenciak@ncl.ac.uk;
Nick E. Barraclough
nick.barraclough@york.ac.uk
†
Present Address:
Joanna Wincenciak,
Institute of Neuroscience, Newcastle
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Perception Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 15 January 2016
Accepted: 25 April 2016
Published: 11 May 2016
Citation:
Wincenciak J, Ingham J, Jellema T
and Barraclough NE (2016) Emotional
Actions Are Coded via Two
Mechanisms: With and without
Identity Representation.
Front. Psychol. 7:693.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00693
Emotional Actions Are Coded via Two
Mechanisms: With and without
Identity Representation
Joanna Wincenciak 1*†, Jennie Ingham 1, Tjeerd Jellema 1 and Nick E. Barraclough 2*
1Department of Psychology, University of Hull, Hull, UK, 2Department of Psychology, University of York, York, UK
Accurate perception of an individual’s identity and emotion derived from their actions
and behavior is essential for successful social functioning. Here we determined the role
of identity in the representation of emotional whole-body actions using visual adaptation
paradigms. Participants adapted to actors performing different whole-body actions in
a happy and sad fashion. Following adaptation subsequent neutral actions appeared to
convey the opposite emotion. We demonstrate two different emotional action aftereffects
showing distinctive adaptation characteristics. For one short-lived aftereffect, adaptation
to the emotion expressed by an individual resulted in biases in the perception of
the expression of emotion by other individuals, indicating an identity-independent
representation of emotional actions. A second, longer lasting, aftereffect was observed
where adaptation to the emotion expressed by an individual resulted in longer-term
biases in the perception of the expressions of emotion only by the same individual; this
indicated an additional identity-dependent representation of emotional actions. Together,
the presence of these two aftereffects indicates the existence of two mechanisms for
coding emotional actions, only one of which takes into account the actor’s identity. The
results that we observe might parallel processing of emotion from face and voice.
Keywords: action perception, emotion, adaptation, social perception, social cognition
INTRODUCTION
Information about the identity and emotional state of other individuals can be derived from
a variety of social cues, including the face, the voice, the body, and whole body actions. The
accurate perception of these cues underlies our ability to function successfully in a complex social
environment. To date, models have been developed to explain how identity and emotion are
derived from faces (Bruce and Young, 1986; Haxby et al., 2000) and voices (Belin et al., 2004;
Campanella and Belin, 2007). However, our understanding of how we process identity and emotion
derived from bodily actions is limited, despite the importance of action information in social
cognition (de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder et al., 2010; Jellema and Perrett, 2012).
Early theories of face perception have argued that recognition of emotional expression and
identity is performed independently, and processed in separate subsystems (Bruce and Young,
1986). However, during social interaction, it is important to be able to evaluate the differing changes
in the emotional expressions of specific individuals engaged in the interaction (Baseler et al., 2012)
and thus link identity and expression together. Indeed various lines of evidence have suggested an
Wincenciak et al. Two Emotional Action Coding Mechanisms
interaction between the processing of facial expression and face
identity (see Calder and Young, 2005).
For example, single unit recordings in the monkey have
shown that a proportion of neurons in the temporal cortex
(Perrett et al., 1984; Hasselmo et al., 1989) and within the
amygdala (Gothard et al., 2007) respond selectively to the
conjunction of specific facial expressions and specific facial
identities. Furthermore, psychophysical evidence (Schweinberger
and Rudiger, 1998; Fox and Barton, 2007; Ellamil et al.,
2008; Campbell and Burke, 2009) has supported the notion
of a partially integrated processing of emotion and identity
information. In addition, recent neuroimaging (e.g., Gobbini
and Haxby, 2007; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Baseler et al.,
2012) and neuropsychological studies (e.g., de Gelder et al.,
2003) have indicated that processing of facial emotion and facial
identity can interact; also see Calder and Young (2005) for a
discussion.
In a similar vein, voice identity and voice emotion have been
proposed to be processed by separate, functionally independent
systems (Belin et al., 2004; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009). As
for faces, these systems are not wholly independent, and the
interactions between them may allow for voice emotion being
processed with reference to the identity of the speaker (Belin
et al., 2004).
In contrast, our understanding of how we conjointly process
information about emotion and identity derived from body
actions is still unclear and models of visual processing of actions
( e.g., Giese and Poggio, 2003; Fleischer et al., 2013) have not
been developed to take into account these factors. Therefore,
in the current study, we investigated if identity played a role
in the perception of emotional actions using visual adaptation
paradigms. Visual adaptation results from prolonged exposure
to a specific visual stimulus causing an aftereffect consisting of
a bias in perception. Typically, perception of a test stimulus is
biased toward the opposite of the adapted stimulus. Examining
the characteristics of the aftereffects allows us to determine the
properties of the underlying visual processing mechanisms, as
has been used previously to understand the representation of
other complex social stimuli like faces (e.g., Leopold et al., 2001;
Webster et al., 2004; Fox and Barton, 2007), biological motion
(e.g., Troje et al., 2006; Roether et al., 2009), implied motion
(Lorteije et al., 2007), and actions (Barraclough et al., 2009;
Barraclough and Jellema, 2011).
In our experiments, participants adapted to whole-body
actions performed in either a happy or sad manner and then
subsequently categorized test actions that were carried out in
a neutral manner. Both physical characteristics of the body
movement such as speed, acceleration or force, and more
subtle relationships between the position of the joints inform
about the type of expressed emotion and thus distinguish
movements performed in happy or sad manner (e.g., Dittrich
et al., 1996; Pollick et al., 2001, 2003; Roether et al., 2009).
We chose happy and sad emotions for our adapting stimuli as
they are opposite in valence with distinctive emotion-specific
features (see Roether et al., 2009 for details). We predicted
that emotional action adaptation would result in subsequent
test actions to appear opposite in emotion to the emotion
conveyed by the adapting action. We tested the role of identity
in the emotional action aftereffects by varying the identity of
the adapting and test actors. Following previous research (Kohn,
2007; Verhoef et al., 2008), we predicted that the magnitude
of the aftereffect would depend upon the degree of similarity
between the adapting and test stimuli. Additionally, in order to
differentiate any putative emotional action aftereffect from other
potential mechanisms, we performed three control experiments.
First, to rule out the potential contribution of post-perceptual
response and decision biases (cf. Hsu and Young, 2004) to
the emotional action aftereffects we employed a 4AFC task in
the adaptation experiment. Here we tested whether participants
categorized test actions as conveying the opposite (cf. Leopold
et al., 2001; Skinner and Benton, 2010), rather than a different
emotion to that of the adapting action. Second, as adaptation
aftereffects show characteristic build-up and decay over time
(e.g., Hershenson, 1989; Leopold et al., 2005; Barraclough et al.,
2012, but see Storrs, 2015), we examined these factors in two
further experiments.
GENERAL METHOD
Participants
Participants were University of Hull staff and students and
received course credit or payment for participating. Participants
had normal or corrected to normal vision. Number of
participants tested in each experiment was based upon previously
reported sample size in action adaptation studies (Experiment
1; c.f. Barraclough and Jellema, 2011; Barraclough et al., 2012)
and determined by the power analysis on data obtained in pilot
studies (Experiments 2–4). All participants were naïve to the
purpose of the study except authors JI (Experiment 1) and JW
(Experiments 2 and 4). Excluding authors’ data from the analysis
did not influence the significance of any results and thus any
conclusions drawn. Experiments were approved by the ethics
committee of the Department of Psychology, University of Hull,
and performed in accordance with the ethical standards laid
down in the 1990 Declaration of Helsinki.
Stimuli
We created two sets of emotional action stimuli by filming
actors performing different actions whilst conveying happy and
sad emotions in varying degrees of intensity, as well as the
same actions conveyed with no emotion (neutral). Emotion was
conveyed by the way the actions were executed rather than
by executing specific emblematic actions (e.g., see Atkinson
et al., 2004; Keefe et al., 2014). Actors were free to interpret
and express each emotion as they wished. We did not want
to instruct actors to move in a specific way to ensure that a
full range of naturalistic bodily expressions were represented
in our stimulus sets. Furthermore, by allowing non-stereotyped
bodily expressions of emotion from our actors, it was possible to
maintain the unique kinematics of actions that help characterize
the identity of the individual actors.
Stimulus Set 1
Sixteen (eight females, eight males) lay actors with no specific
acting experience were filmed. All actors were Caucasian and
were students at the University of Hull. We recruited lay actors
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as previous studies (e.g., Roether et al., 2009; Keefe et al., 2014)
show emotions portrayed by professional and lay actors are
not significantly different from each other; lay actors portray
emotional expressions that are easily recognized and similar to
expressions of professional actors (e.g., Wallbott, 1998; Atkinson
et al., 2007; Grèzes et al., 2007). Actors were filmed (Canon
XL1s, 720 × 576 pixels, 25 fps, progressive scan) performing
four different actions: lifting a box, putting down a box, sitting
down on a chair, and walking to the right. Actors were asked
to perform these actions in an emotionally neutral manner
and whilst conveying happy and sad emotions in two levels of
increasing intensity: moderate (somewhat happy/sad) and high
(very happy/sad). Actors wore plain clothes (e.g., jeans and a dark
t-shirt or jumper) and were filmed with their head at a three-
quarter rear view (the face turned away from the camera), so that
facial expressions could not be seen. This was done to ensure that
the emotional expression and actor’s identity are both conveyed
only by bodily cues (shape and action kinematics) and not by
the clothing or by the face. Recordings were edited to generate
320 (16 actors × 4 actions × 2 emotions × 2 intensity levels,
plus neutral) 2 s long movies. These movies were subsequently
rated by 14 independent observers (11 females, 3 males; mean
ageM = 21.9 years, SD= 4.58 years) on a five-point Likert scale,
where 5 = very happy and 1 = very sad. The 64 actions (16
actors × 4 actions) rated as being most happy (M = 4.27, SD =
0.50), and the 64 actions (16 actors × 4 actions) rated as being
most sad (M = 1.65, SD = 0.46) were used as adapting stimuli.
The 64 neutral actions (16 actors × 4 actions; M = 2.88, SD =
0.28) were used as test stimuli.
Stimulus Set 2
Stimuli in set 2 were selected from the Action Database (Keefe
et al., 2014; http://www-users.york.ac.uk/~neb506/databases.
html). This database contains movies of semi-professional actors
with moderate acting experience (i.e., drama students at the
University of York) and lay actors with no previous acting
experience (i.e., non-drama students and staff at the University of
York). As the lay actors were as able to portray different emotions
through their bodily action similarly to the semi-professional
actors (see Keefe et al., 2014 for details), for this study we selected
sixteen (eight females and eight males) Caucasian actors. The
full details of the filming and validation procedure for these
stimuli are described in Keefe et al. (2014). Briefly, actors were
filmed (Panasonic, HDC-TM900, HD format 1920× 1080 pixels,
at 50 fps progressive scan) in a chroma-green room walking
diagonally to the right so that facial expressions could not be seen.
They portrayed this action in an emotionally neutral manner
whilst conveying emotions in three levels of increasing intensity:
low (slightly happy/sad), moderate (somewhat happy/sad), and
high (very happy/sad). All actors wore a gray t-shirt and dark
trousers to ensure that actor’s identity was conveyed by the bodily
cues (shape and action kinematics) and not by the clothing.
For this stimulus set, a mood induction procedure consisting
of an autobiographical recall was used to help actors convey
specific emotion during filming, and actors were free to convey
the emotion as they wished. Film was edited to key out the green
screen, and generate 112 (16 actors × 2 emotions × 3 intensity
levels, plus neutral) 2 s long movies. Movies were subsequently
rated by 10 (6 females, 4 males; mean age M = 27.1 years, SD
= 9.6 years) independent observers on two independent nine-
point Likert scales, where 1 = neutral, 9 = very happy/very sad,
to ensure that the adapting actions conveyed the appropriate
emotion (for detials of this rating procedure see Keefe et al.,
2014).
For our purposes we chose the 16 actors from the database
that conveyed the happy and sad walking actions with the highest
intensity. For each actor, actions rated as happy (16 movies,
M = 5.31, SD = 1.34) and sad (16 movies,M = 4.56, SD = 1.02)
were selected as adapting stimuli. Neutral actions (16movies, also
rated for happiness: M = 2.77, SD = 0.47, as well as sadness:
M = 2.89, SD= 0.56) were used as test stimuli.
Procedure
A PC running MATLAB 2006a (The MathWorks Inc., Natick,
MA) and the Cogent toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php)
was used to control the experiment, display movies in the
center of a 22” CRT monitor (Philips 202P40, 1600 × 1200
pixels, 100 Hz refresh rate), and record participant responses.
Participants sat ∼57cm from the screen. Movies from stimulus
set 1 were presented such that they filled the entire screen and
subtended ∼41.3 degrees × 31.5 degrees at the eye. Movies
from stimulus set 2 were presented on a black background
such that the full width of the HD movie fitted the horizontal
extent of the screen. To help preclude low-level retinotopic
dependent adaptation, participants freely viewed all stimuli
limiting stereotypic eye-movements. All experiments followed
a standard adaptation procedure (Figure 1) where adapting
movies were followed by a blank inter-stimulus interval (ISI)
containing a small yellow fixation cross, followed by a single test
movie. Participants were required to indicate on a labeled keypad
whether the test movie conveyed happy or sad emotions (2 AFC:
Experiments 1, 3, and 4) or happy, sad, disgusted or surprised
emotions (4 AFC: Experiment 2).
FIGURE 1 | A schematic illustration of a typical single experimental
trial. Duration of the adapting stimulus, inter-stimulus interval (ISI) and test
stimulus differed across experiments and is specified in each method section
for each experiment.
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Data Analysis
For each experiment and each participant and condition, we
calculated the mean aftereffect (see individual sections). Even
though aftereffects with complex social stimuli are typically
quite variable (Barraclough and Jellema, 2011; Barraclough
et al., 2012) a very small number of participants showed
exceptionally large aftereffects. These effects may reflect a
potential problem in the conduct of the task by these individuals
(for example rating the adapting stimulus, and not the test
stimulus). Data was therefore discarded from those outlying
individuals with aftereffects more than 2 SD from the mean
aftereffect. Whenever data from outlying participants have been
excluded, and whether its exclusion influenced the significance
of the results, has been described in the respective results
section.
EXPERIMENT 1: ADAPTATION TO
EMOTIONAL ACTIONS
Experiment 1 tested if exposure to movies of actors portraying
happy and sad emotions through their bodily actions
resulted in emotional action aftereffects: a change in the
perception of neutral actions biased toward the opposite of
the adapted emotion. The adaptation paradigm was adapted
from Fox and Barton (2007), who investigated the role of
identity in emotion perception from faces. The effect of
stimulus similarity on the magnitude of emotional action
aftereffects was tested by varying the similarity between actions
executed in the adapting and test stimuli, and by varying the
similarity between the identities of the actors executing the
actions.
Method
Participants
Twenty participants (14 females, 6males, mean age= 23.85 years,
SD= 8.2 years) took part in the experiment.
Stimuli
Stimuli were selected from stimulus set 1 (see General method
section): two females and two males actors performing three
actions (lifting a box, sitting down, and walking). Actions
performed in a happy and sad manner were used as adapting
stimuli, while actions performed in a neutral manner were used
as test stimuli.
Procedure
Stimuli were presented across five blocks, each containing 24
trials. In an initial control block without adaptation, 12 test
stimuli (depicting four actors performing three actions in a
neutral manner) were presented twice in a pseudorandom
order. Participants categorized the emotion conveyed by the
actor as either happy or sad (scored as: 1 = happy, 0 =
sad). The control block was later used as a baseline for
calculating the aftereffects. The control block was followed
by four counterbalanced adaptation blocks, where 4 different
pairings of adapting and test stimuli were employed, where the
adapting and test stimuli had the same identity/same action,
same identity/different action, different identity/same action,
or different identity/different action. Adapting stimuli (happy
and sad actions) were presented for 16 s (each movie was
repeated eight times), followed by a 0.3 s ISI, and then a test
stimulus presented for 2 s. Each test stimulus was presented
following both happy and sad adaptation stimuli, where this
factor was interleaved within the block. Participants categorized
the emotion conveyed by the test actor as either happy or sad
(scored as: 1 = happy, 0 = sad). Following the participant
response there was an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 5 s before
the start of the next trial. Mean estimates of the emotion
perceived in the test stimuli were calculated separately for the
control, and happy and sad adaptation conditions across the
4 stimulus similarity conditions. “Happy” and “sad” aftereffects
were calculated by subtracting estimates of test stimuli in the
control condition from the happy and sad adaptation conditions,
respectively.
Results
Data from two participants (both female, both age 20) were
discarded from the analysis as one showed outlying data (>2
SD from mean aftereffect) and one did not engage in the task.
Removal of this data did not change the significance of the
following analysis. Aftereffects were tested using a within-subject
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) with factors adaptation emotion
(happy, sad) and stimulus similarity (same identity/same action,
same identity/different action, different identity/same action,
different identity/different action). Adaptation to happy and
sad emotional action movies generated significantly different
aftereffects {F(1, 17) = 11.261, p < 0.005, ηp
2
= 0.40, 95%
CIs: adapt happy [−0.21, −0.015], adapt sad [−0.01, 0.14],
see Figure 2}, where test actions were judged as conveying
the opposite emotion to the adapting stimuli, similar to
other emotional aftereffects seen with biological motion stimuli
(Roether et al., 2009) and facial expressions (Fox and Barton,
2007). As the similarity between the adapting and test stimuli
decreased, so did the aftereffect magnitude {interaction between
adaptation emotion and stimulus similarity: F(2.1, 35.7) = 4.25,
p < 0.05, ηp
2
= 0.20, 95% CIs adapt happy [−0.26, −0.04],
[−0.18, 0.01], [−0.23, 0.0], [−0.20, 0.02], adapt sad [0.03, 0.19],
[−0.03, 0.14], [−0.03, 0.22], [−0.11, 0.08] for each level of
similarity respectively, Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied};
there was no main effect of stimulus similarity {F(2.1, 35.8) =
0.83, p > 0.05, ηp
2
= 0.05, 95% CIs [−0.09, 0.05], [−0.08, 0.05],
[−0.10, 0.08], [−0.13, 0.03], Greenhouse-Geisser correction
applied}.
Happy and sad aftereffects were significantly different only in
those conditions where the adapting and test stimuli contained
the same action, irrespective of identity: same identity/same
action {t(17) = 4.48, p < 0.001, 95% CIs [0.14, 0.39]}; different
identity/same action {t(17) = 2.85, p = 0.011, 95% CIs [0.05,
0.36], Bonferroni correction applied}. For conditions where
the adapting and test stimuli contained different actions,
happy and sad aftereffects were not significantly different
from each other, indicating that adaptation to emotional
action adaptation does not transfer from one action type to
another.
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FIGURE 2 | Emotional action aftereffects for different pairings of
adapting and test actions. Actions executed by the adapting and test
actors could either be the same or different (same action, different action), and
the identity of the actor in the adapting and test stimuli could either be the
same or different (same identity, different identity). Positive values indicate that
adaptation made the test actors appear happier (than in the no-adaptation
condition), negative values indicate that adaptation made the test actors
appear sadder. Error bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM).
EXPERIMENT 2: CONTROL FOR CHANGE
IN RESPONSE CRITERION
In Experiment 2 we clarified whether the emotional action
aftereffects were due to biases in perception rather than post-
perceptual processes, for example biases in participant responses
or decisions. We reasoned that aftereffects resulting from a
perceptual process would result in test actions being categorized
as conveying the opposite emotion following adaptation (see
Hsu and Young, 2004; Webster et al., 2004). Here, perceptual
adaptation to one emotion (e.g., happy) would result in an
increase in the likelihood of only the opposite emotion (sad),
rather than other possible emotions. If, however, the aftereffects
resulted from either a bias in response or decision then
participants would be likely to indicate that the test actions
conveyed “any other” emotion to that of the adapting stimulus.
In these cases, participants could in principle have reasoned that
since the test stimulus was clearly different from the adapting
stimulus, they should select a response option that was clearly
different from the adapting stimulus.
We tested these predictions across the two conditions
that generated significant aftereffects in Experiment 1 (same
action/same identity and same action/different identity). Further,
to check that these two emotional action aftereffects were not
dependent upon any particular set of stimuli, we selected movies
from stimulus set 2 (see General method).
Method
Participants
Fifteen new participants (six females, nine males, mean age =
24.9 years, SD = 3.2 years) took part in the experiment, all were
naïve to the purpose of the experiment except author JW, and
one individual (male, age 28) tested also during Experiment 4.
Removal of these data did not change the significance of the
following analysis.
Stimuli
Stimuli were obtained from stimulus set 2 (see General method).
Eight females and eight males actors performing walking actions
were selected for the experiment. Walking actions performed in
a happy and sad manner were used as adapting stimuli, while
walking actions in a neutral manner were used as test stimuli.
Procedure
Stimuli were presented across four blocks; an initial control
block without adaptation (the 16 test stimuli presented twice
in a pseudorandom order), followed by two counterbalanced
adaptation blocks (where on each trial adapting and test stimuli
were paired to create same identity/same action and different
identity/same action combinations of stimulus similarity), and
a final control block identical to block 1. The control condition
was split across two blocks (before and after adaptation), in
order to obtain a stable measure of test stimulus emotion over
the duration of the experiment. Adapting stimuli (happy and
sad actions) were displayed for 8 s (by repeating the movie
four times); the ISI was 0.4 s. Each test stimulus was presented
following happy and sad adaptation. Participants categorized
each test movie as happy, sad, surprised or disgusted (a 4AFC
task). Surprise and disgust were selected as additional options
as they vary from happiness and sadness in valence and arousal
(Russell, 1980). Following the participant response there was
an inter-trial interval of 5 s before the start of the next trial.
For each participant, and each adaptation block, we calculated
percentage of responses for each of the 4 possible emotions
(happy, sad, surprised, and disgusted; cf. Skinner and Benton,
2010). We averaged the responses from both control blocks and
calculated the percentage of each response as for the adaptation
blocks. Aftereffects were calculated by subtracting the percentage
of each response from the control blocks from percentage of each
response to the same stimuli following happy and sad adaptation
for same and different identity conditions separately.
Results
Aftereffects were tested using ANOVA with the within-subject
factors of adaptation emotion (happy, sad), stimulus similarity
(same identity/same action, different identity/same action) and
response emotion (happy, sad, surprised, disgusted). Both the
same and different identity aftereffects resulted from shifts in the
perception of action emotion (rather than a bias in response or
decision) as participants categorized test movies as conveying
the opposite to the adapted emotion rather than “any other”
emotion {interaction adaptation emotion × response emotion,
F(1.81, 25.4) = 27.20, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.66; 95% CIs adapt happy
[−22.05,−7.00], [7.01, 22.51], [−3.54, 2.71], [−4.72, 1.39], adapt
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sad [−1.07, 17.32], [−14.59, −2.07], [−2.82, 3.23], [−4.34, 5.17]
for happy, sad, surprised, disgusted response option respectively,
Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied, Figure 3}. As suggested
by Figure 3, the same identity aftereffects were significantly
bigger (M = 15.8) than the different identity aftereffects (M =
6.0). This was confirmed by a three-way interaction (adaptation
emotion × stimulus similarity × response emotion, ANOVA,
F(3, 42) = 14.49, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.50, see Appendix for 95%
CIs). No other main effects or interactions reached significance.
Post-hoc paired t-tests revealed that adaptation only affected the
categorization of test stimuli as happy {same identity: t(14) = 5.88,
95%CIs [−41.51,−19.32] different identity: t(14) = 3.11, 95%CIs
[23.17, 42.66], both ps < 0.0125, Bonferroni correction applied},
and sad {same identity: t(14) = 7.25, 95% CIs [−18.28, −3.37],
different identity: t(14) = 3.38, 95% CIs [4.87, 21.78], both ps <
0.0125, Bonferroni correction applied} and had no effect on the
choice of surprised or disgusted labels (all ps > 0.27).
EXPERIMENT 3: DYNAMICS OF
EMOTIONAL ACTION AFTEREFFECTS
The first two experiments indicated that adaptation influences
perceptual mechanisms that represent emotional actions, and
that these mechanisms are selective for the executed action. We
find that when the identities of the adapting and test actors
FIGURE 3 | Aftereffect magnitude calculated as the change in the
mean percentage of the responses for each of the four possible
emotions conveyed by test stimuli following happy and sad adaptation
(positive values indicate more often selected emotion following
adaptation; negative values indicate less often selected emotion
following adaptation). The identity of the actors in the adapting and test
stimuli were either the same (A) or different (B). Error bars represent standard
error of the mean (SEM).
are the same, aftereffects are greater than when the identities
of the adapting and test actors are different (Figures 2, 3).
Similar to the face aftereffects observed by Fox and Barton
(2007) this indicates that action emotion can be represented
irrespective of actor identity, but also actor identity can influence
the representation of action emotion. These results suggest
that there are two potential mechanisms underlying the coding
of action emotion that are both susceptable to percetual
adaptation. Adaptation aftereffects seen with other stimuli show
a characteristic logarithmic build-up and exponential decay over
time, e.g., for motion (Hershenson, 1989), faces (Leopold et al.,
2005; Rhodes et al., 2007), biological motion (Troje et al.,
2006), and actions (e.g., Barraclough et al., 2009). To further
test whether our two emotional action aftereffects show the
same characteristic dynamics as previously reported perceptual
aftereffects we examined their build-up and decay over time.
We tested the effect of adapting stimulus duration and the
duration of the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) between the adapting
and test stimuli on aftereffect magnitude in two separate,
fully factorial experiments (Experiment 3a: same identity/same
action aftereffect; Experiment 3b: different identity/same action
aftereffect). Furthermore, these results would help further
distinguish the perceptual aftereffects we observe from other
post-perceptual processes.
Method
Participants
Nineteen new participants (11 females, 8 males, mean age= 20.4
years, SD = 3.8 years) took part in Experiment 3a; a further 18
new participants (12 females, 6 males, mean age = 24.7 years,
SD= 6.7 years) took part in Experiment 3b. All participants were
naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Stimuli
Stimuli were obtained from stimulus set 1 (see General method).
Eight females and eight males actors performing four different
actions (lifting a box, putting down a box, sitting down on a
chair, and walking to the right) were selected for the experiment.
Actions performed in a happy and sad manner were used as
adapting stimuli, while actions in a neutral manner were used as
test stimuli.
Procedure
In both experiments we varied the duration of the adapting
stimulus (2, 4, 8, 16 s) by repeating the adapting movie a
number of times (1, 2, 4, 8 repeats), and varied the ISI between
the adapting and test stimuli (200, 400, 600, 1600 ms in
Experiment 3a; 400, 800, 1600, 3200 ms in Experiment 3b). In
each experiment, therefore, there were 32 different adaptation
conditions (4 adaptation repeats × 4 ISIs x 2 emotions) that
occurred in a pseudorandom order. The choice of adaptation
durations and ISIs in Experiment 3a was based upon previous
measures of the duration of face identity aftereffects (Leopold
et al., 2005) and whole body aftereffects (Barraclough et al.,
2012) where significant aftereffect declines were observed over
1600ms. Following Experiment 3a we conducted Experiment 3b,
here we decided to extend the range of tested ISIs to 3200ms
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to better sample the possible decline of aftereffects over time. In
Experiment 3a the identity of the actor and the type of action
performed in the adapting and test movies were identical on
every trial. In Experiment 3b, the type of action performed by
the actor in the adapting and test movies was identical on every
trial, however, the identity (and gender) of the actor was always
different. Participants completed 320 trials in total over two
testing sessions. Participants categorized the emotion conveyed
by the test actor as either happy or sad (scored as: 1= happy, 0=
sad). Following the participant response there was an inter-trial
interval (ITI) of 5 s before the start of the next trial.
Aftereffects were calculated by subtracting the mean ratings
of the test stimuli following adaptation to sad stimuli from
the mean ratings of the test stimuli following adaptation to
happy stimuli. This difference value represented the magnitude
of the aftereffect. Here, positive values indicated typical, repulsive
aftereffects, where following adaptation the emotion conveyed
by the test actors looked like the opposite of the emotion
conveyed by the adapting actors. Negative aftereffects values
indicated that following adaptation, the emotion conveyed by
the test actors looks similar to the emotion conveyed by the
adapting actors. Although this method precludes identifying the
relative contribution of happy and sad actions to emotional
aftereffect dynamics, it reduces any systematic biases, maximizes
the magnitude of any aftereffects and eliminates the necessity
for a control condition without adaptation, thereby allowing us
to test many experimental conditions within a limited testing
period.
Results
Mean aftereffects for the 16 different conditions were calculated
in both Experiments 3a and 3b and are plotted in Figure 4.
Data from one participant (female, age 20) in Experiment 3a
was discarded from the analysis as outlying data. Repeating the
analysis with this data did not change the significance of the
results when testing with ANOVA. For both Experiments 3a
and 3b, all aftereffects were positive, indicating that under all
conditions adaptation had a repulsive effect. The dynamics of the
emotional action aftereffects, however, appeared to be different
in the two experiments (compare Figures 4A,B). As the groups
of participants and the durations of the ISIs between the two
experiments were different, we analyzed the two experiments
separately using 2-way ANOVAs (4 adaptation repeats × 4 ISI
durations).
For Experiment 3a (same identity) increasing the duration of
the adapting stimulus results in significantly larger aftereffects
[main effect of adaptation repeats: F(3, 51) = 5.72, p < 0.005,
ηp
2
= 0.25, see Appendix for 95% CIs]. There was, however,
no significant effect of ISI duration [main effect of ISI: F(3,51)
= 1.04, p = 0.38, ηp
2
= 0.06, see Appendix for 95% CIs]
nor a significant interaction between adaptation repeats and
ISI duration [adaptation repeats × ISI: F(9, 153) = 0.90, p =
0.53, ηp
2
= 0.05, see Appendix for 95% CIs]. For Experiment
3b (different identity) increasing the duration of the adapting
stimulus results in significantly larger aftereffects [main effect
of adaptation repeats: F(3, 51) = 9.94, p < 0.001, ηp
2
= 0.37,
see Appendix for 95% CIs]. Although a reduction in aftereffect
FIGURE 4 | Emotional action aftereffects magnitude as a function of
adaptation repeats and ISI duration for Experiment 3a (A) and
Experiment 3b (B). All aftereffects showed positive values typical of repulsive
aftereffects, where test stimuli looked more like the opposite of the adapting
stimuli. Error bars indicate SEM.
magnitude with ISI was apparent from Figure 3B (i.e., overall
reduction in the size of bars across ISI durations), this was not
significant [main effect of ISI: F(3, 51) = 1.95, p = 0.132, ηp
2
=
0.10, see Appendix for 95% CIs] nor was the interaction between
adaptation repeats and ISI significant [adaptation repeats × ISI:
F(9, 153) = 0.90, p= 0.52, ηp
2
= 0.05, see Appendix for 95% CIs].
The reason for the lack of significance of ISI on aftereffect
magnitude in Experiment 3b may be due to a number of
factors. First, following 1 repeat of the adapting stimulus there
was little aftereffect at any ISI. Indeed, significant aftereffects
were only found following 4 or 8 adaptation stimulus repeats
(one-sample t-tests, p < 0.0031, Bonferroni correction applied).
This contrasts with the analysis of the same identity aftereffects
measured in Experiment 3a, where significant aftereffects were
found following 1, 2, 4, and 8 adaptation stimulus repeats (one-
sample t-tests, p < 0.0031, Bonferroni correction applied). The
small and non-significant aftereffects in Experiment 3b obtained
after 1 and 2 repeats may have contributed to the non-significant
main effect of ISI. Second, the range of ISIs that we tested for
both Experiments 3a and 3b may have been too restricted, with
aftereffects tested over a greater range of ISIs we may have found
a significant decline in the magnitude of both same identity and
different identity aftereffects.
In order to better illustrate the build-up and decay of the
emotional action aftereffects we re-plotted the aftereffects for
same and different identity conditions on a semi-log scale, as a
function of adaptation repeats (Figures 5A,B) and ISI duration
(Figures 5C,D; cf. Leopold et al., 2005). The lack of decay of the
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FIGURE 5 | Same identity (A,C) and different identity (B,D) aftereffects plotted on a semi-log scale. Aftereffects build-up with adaptation repeats (A,B), and
aftereffects decline with ISI (C,D).
aftereffects in the same identity condition raised a possibility that
same identity and different identity aftereffects show a difference
in storage. Storage occurs when a period of non-stimulation (e.g.,
darkness) is imposed between the adapting and the test stimulus.
In consequence, the decay of an aftereffect is delayed as it persists
for a period of non-stimulation (Thompson and Wright, 1994).
Storage has previously been reported for motion aftereffects (e.g.,
Thompson and Wright, 1994; Watamaniuk and Heinen, 2007)
and face aftereffects (Leopold et al., 2001; Hsu and Young, 2004)
suggesting that emotional action aftereffects may also exhibit a
storage effect. Therefore in Experiment 4 we tested the decay
of emotional action aftereffect over a short (400ms) and long
(10.8 s) ISI durations.
EXPERIMENT 4: AFTEREFFECT DURATION
TESTED WITH LONGER INTER-STIMULUS
INTERVALS
In Experiment 4 we wanted to assess whether the lack of
significant decline with time observed in Experiments 3a and
b was a function of the ISIs originally chosen, and whether
the similarity of the identity of the actor in the adapting and
test stimuli had an influence on the duration of aftereffects.
Experiments 3a and 3b gave an indication for the duration of
emotional action aftereffects following 4 repeats of adapting
stimuli. At short ISIs (400ms) we expected to see significant
aftereffects in the same identity/same action condition, as well
as in the different identity/same action condition. At long ISIs
(10.8 s), however, we expected to see no decline in the same
identity/same action condition, but a decline in the different
identity/same action condition.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-four new participants (16 females, 8 males, mean age =
21.5 years, SD = 3.1 years) took part in the experiment; all were
naïve to the purpose of the experiment except author JW.
Stimuli
Stimuli were obtained from stimulus set 1 (see General methods).
Four females and 4 males actors performing four different
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actions (lifting a box, putting down a box, sitting down, and
walking) were selected for the experiment. Actions performed
in a happy and sad manner were used as adapting stimuli,
while actions performed in a neutral manner were used as test
stimuli.
Procedure
Stimuli were presented across two counterbalanced blocks, where
on each trial adapting and test stimuli were paired up to create
same identity/same action or different identity/same action
stimulus similarity conditions. Adapting stimuli (happy or sad
actions) were presented for 8 s (repeated four times). Inter-
stimulus intervals, determined in pilot testing, were 400ms and
10.8 s. Each test stimulus was presented following happy and sad
adaptation and each ISI. Participants categorized the emotion
conveyed by the test actor as either happy or sad (scored as: 1 =
happy, 0 = sad). Following the participant response there was
an inter-trial interval (ITI) of 5 s before the start of the next trial.
We calculated mean estimates of test stimuli following happy and
sad adaptation separately for each of the four different conditions
(identity × ISI). We then calculated aftereffect magnitudes by
subtracting responses following sad adaptation from responses
following happy adaptation.
Results
Data from two participants (male, age 19; female, age 20) were
discarded from the analysis as they showed outlying data (>2
SD from mean aftereffect). Results with and without the outlying
data are described below. Aftereffects were analyzed using
ANOVA with within-subject factors of identity (same, different)
and ISI duration (0.4, 10.8 s). The aftereffects in the same
identity/same action condition were significantly larger than the
aftereffects in the different identity/same action condition, as
seen in the previous two experiments {Figure 6; ANOVA, main
effect of identity, F(1, 21) = 5.74, p < 0.05, ηp
2
= 0.25, 95%
CIs [0.20, 0.44], [0.09, 0.30] for same and different identity
respectively}. Importantly there was a significant interaction
between identity and ISI {F(1, 21) = 4.77, p < 0.05, ηp
2
= 0.18,
95% CIs; same identity [0.16, 0.40], [0.21, 0.51]; different identity
[0.13, 0.37], [−0.01,0.28] for 0.4 s and 10.8 s ISI respectively},
in which the aftereffect in the different identity/same action
condition declined over time, whereas the aftereffect in the
same identity/same action condition appeared to persist. There
was no main effect of ISI {F(1, 21) = 0.07, p = 0.79, ηp
2
=
0.00, 95% CIs [0.16, 0.37], [0.14, 0.36] for same and different
identity respectively}. Including the outlying data from the
two participants who showed strong priming effects influenced
only the identity × ISI interaction which became a trend
{F(1, 23) = 3.66, p = 0.06, ηp
2
= 0.14, 95% CIs; same identity
[0.07, 0.36], [0.14, 0.46]; different identity [0.06, 0.33], [−0.05,
0.25] for 0.4 and 10.8 s ISI respectively}. The aftereffects in
the different identity/same action condition therefore appeared
to show a similar decline over time as for other high level
and action aftereffects (Leopold et al., 2005; Troje et al.,
2006; Barraclough et al., 2012). The aftereffects in the same
identity/same action condition, however, showed a different
pattern.
FIGURE 6 | Emotional action aftereffects as a function of the ISI. Error
bars represent standard error of the mean (SEM).
DISCUSSION
Here we show that adaptation to naturalistic movies of whole-
body actions results in emotional aftereffects. Adaptation to an
actor conveying either happiness or sadness biases subsequent
perception of emotion conveyed by either the same or another
individual to appear like the opposite emotion. Importantly, we
see that the characteristics of the aftereffects are dependent upon
whether the subsequent individual has the same or a different
identity to the adapting actor.
The effects observed here are likely to result from adaptation
of high level action coding mechanisms that represent the
emotions of actors. The emotional action aftereffects show
several of the characteristics of previously observed high-level
aftereffects. First, similarity between adapting and test stimuli
determined aftereffect magnitude (see Kohn, 2007; Verhoef
et al., 2008). Aftereffects were largest when the identity and the
action of the adapting and test stimuli were the same. As the
identity or the action differed between these stimuli, aftereffects
became smaller. In addition, aftereffects failed to transfer across
different actions suggesting that the aftereffects did not result
from cognitive biases, where decision regarding the test stimuli
could be based purely on the valence information. Second,
the adaptation aftereffects observed here did not result from a
change in the response or decisions made by the participants
during the experiments. Experiment 2 showed that participants
did not alter their response following adaptation; rather, they
selectively categorized the emotion of the test stimuli as the
emotion opposite to the adaptor’s emotion (discussed in Hsu
and Young, 2004). Third, aftereffect magnitude increased with
adaptation exposure as for other high-level action and face
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aftereffects (e.g., Leopold et al., 2005; Barraclough et al., 2012, but
see Storrs, 2015). Fourth, the aftereffects that resulted from the
different identity/same action condition appeared to decline over
time, similar to other high-level action and face aftereffects (e.g.,
Leopold et al., 2005; Barraclough et al., 2012). The aftereffects
that resulted from the same identity/same action condition,
however, appeared to show a storage effect, similar to motion
(e.g., Thompson and Wright, 1994; Watamaniuk and Heinen,
2007) and face aftereffects (Leopold et al., 2001; Hsu and Young,
2004).
Finally, the dominating effect here was the effect of high-
level emotion adaptation, as the aftereffect was predominantly
determined by the emotion conveyed by the adapting actor. Low-
level retinotopic dependent adaptation is unlikely to explain the
effects that we observe here, as adapting and test stimuli were
dynamic with naturally occurring differences in expressions of
emotions and kinematics across actors. Furthermore, actors were
never presented in precisely overlapping retinotopic locations
(comparable to e.g., Butler et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2008).
Together, these results rule out other possible low-level or post-
perceptual explanations for emotional action aftereffects that
might account for some other demonstrations of high-level
perceptual aftereffects.
We cannot, however, rule out the contribution of adaptation
in motion processing mechanisms, which is likely to occur
simultaneously when viewing complex action stimuli (e.g.,
Benton et al., 2016). Action speed is an important cue in the
emotion recognition from body actions (e.g., Dittrich et al.,
1996; Pollick et al., 2001, 2003; Roether et al., 2009), and is
likely to have influenced the aftereffects observed here, but is
unlikely to be a dominating factor. Other postural and dynamic
features that do not rely on speed are also critical for expression
and for perception of emotional actions (e.g., Atkinson et al.,
2007; Roether et al., 2009). These postural (e.g., head angle) and
dynamic (e.g., expressiveness) features present in happy and sad
actions, even when these are matched for speed, are sufficient
to elicit emotional action aftereffects (Roether et al., 2009). It
is therefore plausible that the aftereffects observed here resulted
from adaptation at multiple levels of action visual processing.
Importantly, our studies with emotional action aftereffects
indicate that identity plays a role in the representations of
emotional actions, and identity can modulate the way that
emotional actions are processed. When the identities of the
adapting and test actors were the same aftereffects were larger
than when the identities of the adapting and test actors were
different. Furthermore, when the identities of the adapting
and test actors were the same, the aftereffects did not appear
to decline over the time period we tested (up to 10.8 s). In
contrast, when the identities of the adapting and test actors were
different, the aftereffects declined over time. Thus, emotional
action aftereffects show different magnitudes and decay functions
dependent upon the relationship between the identity of adapting
and test actors.
One explanation for our results is that emotional actions
are represented in both an identity-dependent and identity-
independent way. The aftereffects observed following adaptation
in the different identity/same action condition might result from
adaptation of a mechanism that represents emotional actions in
an entirely identity-independent fashion. Whilst the aftereffects
observed following adaptation in the same identity/same action
condition might result from adaptation of mechanisms that
represent emotional actions in both an identity-independent as
well as an identity-dependent way.When adapting and test actors
have the same identity, the aftereffects increase in magnitude
and appear to last much longer than typical high-level action or
face aftereffects. The increase in aftereffect magnitude could be
explained by an increase in visual similarity between the adapting
and test stimuli. However, this increase in visual similarity could
not abolish the decay of the aftereffect over time in the way that
we observe here. A parsimonious explanation is that an identity-
dependent mechanism is additionally adapted when adapting
and test stimuli have the same identities, resulting in a larger
aftereffect and a longer-lasting influence on the representations
of the emotions of individual actors. Such long-lasting aftereffects
are not necessarily unusual, as they have been previously reported
with other social stimuli such as gaze direction (e.g., Kloth and
Schweinberger, 2008) and face configuration (e.g., McKone et al.,
2005; Carbon and Ditye, 2011, 2012). These previous effects,
however, were observed with much longer adaptation periods
than we have used in our experiment reported here. Identity has
also been shown to affect the decay of face aftereffects (Kiani et al.,
2014). Brief presentation of an unrelated, intervening face in the
period between the adaptation and the test phase, accelerated
the decay of face aftereffects by 85%, whilst presentation of a
face of an opposite to the adapted identity did not affect the
decay (Kiani et al., 2014). However, it is not yet clear whether
other inferences could have contributed to the quick decay
of aftereffects in the different identity/same action condition
observed here.
For both identity-dependent and identity-independent
aftereffects, adaptation never transferred across different actions.
Different actions have different kinematics, and bodily expression
of emotion is dependent upon the characteristic kinematics of
the action (e.g., see Roether et al., 2009). The failure of adaptation
to one set of characteristic movements to exert an influence on
the perception of a very different set of movements, suggests
that actor emotion may be coded within action specific neural
mechanisms.
In some ways, these results parallel findings of face emotion
aftereffects. Evidence from face adaptation studies suggest the
existence of a common visual representation that underlies the
coding of face identity and face expression (Ellamil et al., 2008;
Rhodes et al., 2015). This common representation may contain
one dimension that codes both the identity and expression, and
the other dimension that is selective for identity or expression
(Calder, 2011; Rhodes et al., 2015). These findings are also
consistent with Haxby et al.’s (2000) model of face perception,
where neural substrates that underlie processing of invariant
(e.g., identity) and changeable (e.g., expression) aspects of the
face are thought to be disocciable, although the model also
suggests they may interact. Specifically, the fusiform face area
(FFA), predominantly involved in the coding of the invariant
aspects of the face, may also play a supportive role in the coding
of emotional expressions (Haxby et al., 2000).
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Similarly, processing of voice identity and voice emotion is
thought to be processed by seperate, but interacting systems
(Belin et al., 2004; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009), where voice
identity is processed within the anterior STS (Belin et al., 2004)
and voice emotion is processed by several separate regions
including the amygdala, anterior insula, and temporo-medial
and inferior prefrontal cortex (Imaizumi et al., 1997; Buchanan
et al., 2000). While early analysis of vocal input (from primary
auditory cortex to the middle part of the STS) is shared for
different types of vocal information, at the highest level of
voice processing the pathways become independent (Belin et al.,
2004).
The similarity between the aftereffects we observed with
emotional action adaptation and our understanding of how
faces (Haxby et al., 2000; Ellamil et al., 2008; Campbell and
Burke, 2009) and voices (Belin et al., 2004) are processed
suggest that similar, parallel processing systems might underlie
the coding of emotion and identity information from these
different social signals. Action representation within the STS
can be modulated by emotional body language (Grèzes et al.,
2007), and adaptation within this region (cf. Grossman et al.,
2010) might underlie the emotional action aftereffect showing
identity-independence. The neural substrates underlying our
ability to recognize actor identity from body form and motion
have not been well delineated, but may involve the Extrastriate
Body Area (EBA; Saxe et al., 2006; Urgesi et al., 2007)
along with regions in the anterior temporal lobe (although
see Downing and Peelen, 2011). Adaptation in more anterior
regions of the temporal cortex that takes into account actor
identity may underlie the emotional action aftereffect that is
influenced by the identity of the individual actors; although
this suggestion is more speculative. Anterior cortical regions
do not show the same adaptation characteristics as the more
posterior cortical regions (cf. Verhoef et al., 2008). The less
characteristic longer lasting adaptation effects observed here, and
also seen in some face adaptation experiments (e.g., Carbon
and Ditye, 2011, 2012), may result from the effects of stimulus
repetition on later stages of processing inducing a longer term
recalibration of the representation of individuals. Such long
lasting aftereffects may shift the observer’s reference point
according to their recent experience in order to optimize the
sensory processing of the external world over a longer period
of time.
CONCLUSIONS
This study has demonstrated that prior exposure to emotional
whole-body actions influences the perception of the emotion
conveyed by subsequent actions via a perceptual adaptation
mechanism. Our visual adaptation experiments reveal two
separate processing mechanisms for emotional actions with
different characteristics: one mechanism that processes
actor emotion irrespective of actor identity, and one that
processes actor emotion taking into account actor identity.
This organization parallels recent data on the processing of face
information that suggest that rather than completely separate
processing of emotion and identity, representations of emotion,
and identity can interact. These mechanisms we study here
would not only help us to determine the emotions of individuals
around us from their actions and behavior, but also critically
ensure the identity of the individual is linked to the specific
emotions expressed.
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